On holiday in New Zealand with the family, so you get Monitoring After Deployment
Category: Editorial
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The Change Failure Rate
One of the measurements used in DevOps to determine if your team is improving is the change failure rate. This is the number of times that there is a problem with a deployment as a ratio of the total number of deployments. The idea here is to determine the reliability, and to some extent, the risk of deploying changes in your environment.
In the past, I’ve been very successful with deployments as a DBA or developer. Often I’ve completed database changes within the change window, with success that allowed our applications to run after changes. That doesn’t mean I pressed a button and the deployment worked. On a regular basis, my expertise with SQL was needed to fix a script or re-run a process, or make some other “development change” in the production environment to ensure the entire deployment completed. While still a minority of times, this wasn’t an uncommon experience.
Many people have had the same experience, as the State of DevOps report has shown for years. In both the application and database worlds, doing anything other than pressing a button or running a single script is a deployment failure if the steps aren’t clearly documented and run to completion without any alteration. Not a catastrophic failure, and certainly one that many of us can recover from, but still a failure from the standpoint of being ready to deploy and having a reliable process.
Quite a few of us have made a career of cleaning up other people’s messes in deployments, with our ability to get changes deployed and applications back up and running being a testament to our expertise and skill. That’s not a reliable process, especially when an organization is forced to depend on a Steve or a Brent or a Kendra to ensure smooth deployments. That’s a recipe for disaster, especially as all of us want to go on holiday, undisturbed by some software “emergency”.
I think this is one of the more telling metrics for a strong software development process and a reliable deployment process. If this number isn’t extremely high, in the 95-99% range, then our organizations are spending resources, especially time, on items that don’t add value. Instead, we ought to invest in moving to a DevOps style process that allows our expertise to be used solving new problems, not cleaning up the mess of the poor development practices of others.
Steve Jones
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High Prices for High Security
I was excited to see the new Secure Enclave technology come to Always Encrypted (AE) in SQL Server 2019. I’ve thought that the way Microsoft implemented the AE technology in SQL Server 2016 was a start and a good step forward, but it had too many restrictions. Kind of like Availability Groups in 2012 and In-Memory technology in 2014. A good idea, but not really ready for most of us to use.
One of the biggest restrictions in SQL Server 2016, in my opinion, was the inability to run range queries on encrypted data. These are the greater than, less than, and LIKE items that many of us need to use in applications. This made sense, since the server doesn’t know how to decrypt the data, but many applications need these queries.
That goes away in SQL Server 2019 with Secure Enclaves. I’m looking forward to testing and working with this, but there’s one interesting limitation for me. The SQL Server computer that runs the secure enclave must meet one of these requirements. It has to run on Windows 10 or Windows 2019 Server – Datacenter Edition. There also has to be an HGS server for attestation, but this can be a WS2019 Standard Edition.
Is it a big deal? I don’t know. Windows Server 2019 lists with Datacenter at $6155 and Standard at $972. That means it will cost me $5,183 for Always Encrypted on my SQL Server. Not a bad price for the encryption and additional security. An HSM appliance goes for quite a bit. One in Azure is $5k + $4.85/hour and most of the enterprise appliances I’ve priced at $10k+. And you need two.
In some sense, maybe this doesn’t matter. The cost of $5k isn’t much, especially when you consider the downside of not using encryption and having a data breech. You don’t need this on all SQL Servers, just those that need AE, and even then you can run SQL Server Standard Edition. The cost of core licensing is likely going to already be quite a bit and this is just like having to pay for a few more cores. Is this an impediment for your organization?
At first this seemed like a burden, but the more I look at it, $5k isn’t a lot for encryption on your server. I hope this doesn’t deter organizations from adopting AE, and more importantly, I hope Microsoft continues to invest in this technology. I’d like to see multi-certificate support and the ability to easily revoke access for a compromised system while I deal with any security issues. There are other things, and we’ll see how this evolves in the future.
Steve Jones
Listen to the podcast at Libsyn.
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Long Live All Passwords
I remember the first time I had to create a password for a system. It was an application that a friend and I wrote, and we wanted to separate the ways that we stored data, so we added a login routine to the system. It stored a (plain text) password, but hey, this was 1983. We loaded the password and made a string comparison with the entry by the user.
Since that time, most organizations I’ve worked in have had password policies in place on the network. These passwords often had expiration dates, with short warnings for users to change their passwords. The requirement to change never seemed to come at a good time, and with the requirement to not reuse one of the last 5 or 10 passwords, this resulted in users often adding a 1, 2, 3, etc. to the same password. As an IT pro, I often tried to get users to choose new passwords, which fell on deaf ears.
Microsoft is rethinking the idea of passwords expiring. There’s a piece that explains how they feel this requirement is not helping security. This is similar to a piece at SANS that notes the practice is not helpful. Changing passwords has a cost to your organization in extra tickets for a help desk, lost productivity from dealing with expiration, and frustration from users. What’s worse, far too many users just “update” a password with a number or year. Neither of which is effective.
The current advice is MFA (multi-factor authentication), passphrases, and password managers. Personally I try to use all of these where I can, and choose long passwords. It does seem that many companies are updating apps to allow longer passwords and 2FA. I’d like to see this embedded into more frameworks, making it easier for developers to implement secure authentication systems. That, or use existing systems out there, like oAuth, though there is an argument how secure this is. Even if there are issues, it’s likely better than what most developers would build.
In SQL Server, we have group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA), which are a good way to avoid password management, and ensure complex passwords. We should disable, and set a complex password for, the sa account. While I wouldn’t advocate changing this regularly, I would have alerts if the account is enabled.
Like most people, I try to avoid changing passwords unnecessarily, especially these days where I have accounts at dozens (or hundreds) of places. I do, however, ensure that all are different and unrelated. At least then if a password is compromised, I don’t worry about someone logging into a different service I use with the same credentials.
Steve Jones
Listen to the podcast at Libsyn