Tag: security

  • Audio Attacks

    There are running jokes about how Amazon Alexa and Google Home are susceptible to visitors in your home. It’s become a bit of test from some geeks who will walk in your house and call “Hey, Alexa” out loud to see if you have a device that’s available. I even had an accidental Siri activation while recording some content recently. I said something that started Siri listening on my phone and then a few people nearby kept trying to duplicate the effort. Fortunately Siri wouldn’t come on, so no one was able to cause too much trouble. I suspect that the speakers in the recording room weren’t positioned well enough to allow the control room based hacking.

    I know that will change. In fact, even if Apple and other companies manage to get digital assistants to recognize specific people’s voices (as rumored), technology marches on. People are already starting to fake audio data. The fidelity of digital recording and capabilities of speakers improve constantly. This is going to be a greater and greater issue over time, and I have no idea what security technique will prevent things. Maybe we need two factor authentication for audio commands? Won’t that defeat the purpose?

    As data professionals, we are going to be dealing with more and more types of data, and trying to process, analyze, and act on information. This is one reason that I think understanding data lakes and being able to import and combine many types and formats of data will be a valuable skill for all data professionals. Whether you use something like Azure Data Lake or another platform, I expect to be combining data in all sorts of ways and providing information to users.

    While speech recognition might not be something many of us worry about, will we want to extract information from audio or video and use it? Do we expect that audio files have more integrity than other sources? I worry that we give some types of data more veracity than others, when all types are subject to hacking. Some of us may get audio files as data, and it’s only a matter of time before we get hacked, perhaps with fake audio.

    One of the issues we have with some data is determining the source of record. If I record my voice as a sample, and you compare all future audio of me to that sample, you can verify my identity, right? What if someone can fake my voice with simple software? It sounds crazy, but those days are coming, especially if our systems are susceptible to a person stitching together words from different captures, such as some of Baracksdubs. What might be worse is when we find someone hacking a database and replacing the samples. What’s the source of record then?

    As I spend more time in this business, I become more convinced that auditing and monitoring are more important that security. We want them all, but I’d rather know I have an issue than assume my systems are protected because the security doesn’t appear to be broken.

    Steve Jones

     

  • Security and Patching Struggles

    A couple weeks ago we had a huge security issue with the WannaCry ransomware racing across the world. I was out of the office, and mostly offline, so I was a bit out of touch. However, many organizations were affected, and I’m sure many infrastructure people were scrambling to patch and protect vulnerable systems, possibly even restore affected systems. I certainly hope that most (or all) organizations didn’t pay any ransoms. For the future, my view is it’s better to lose a little data and restore systems than pay ransoms.
    I can remember when we got patches at random times, as vendors wanted to provide more functionality or finally had enough bugs fixed to release a patch. Sysadmins struggled to deploy these patches, being out of practice from the infrequency and struggling with non-standardized ways of applying updates. There was also the concern about the quality of patches, many of which introduced more bugs and issues. In the Windows world, I found many companies wanting to wait until an SP2 was released before applying, or even upgrading, many systems.
    That changed, with many companies moving to regular patches, and standard ways of applying, or even slipstreaming, patches easily onto machines. I welcomed the Microsoft Patch Tuesdays, as this provided a regular release, an expectation, and both admins and users became comfortable with the idea of regular patches. I haven’t loved the auto patches in Windows 10, but I find myself agreeing with Troy Hunt that we should just be patching. In an organization you may want someone to be responsible, but for home users, just patch.
    And, by the way, vendors, you need to do more work, and be more responsive to any issues that come up from patches. Your quality issues lead to greater security issues.
    If you want to ready about the WannaCry issue, there’s a good general post, as well as some guidance from the SQL Server perspective. If you haven’t patched, that’s something you should do ASAP, and while you’re at it, be sure you have the latest security patches for SQL Server applied. I’ve got a series of Build Lists at SQLServerCentral, one for each version. I’m still nervous about applying Cumulative Updates too quickly, but I certainly would download and have them ready, perhaps applying each a month late once once the early adopters have had a chance to report any major problems.
    Patching is a reality for the modern software world. We get regular patches for applications, but our core infrastructure (including servers, desktops, and various devices) also need patches to the OS and platforms. There’s a balance between ensuring stability with known softwre versions and keeping up with patches to prevent problems. We need to find a balance, which is probably different for each organization, and re-evaluate periodically if we are updating an an appropriate level. I lean towards fewer patches when I can, but I always want to keep up with security patches. We never know when someone will take advantage of those.
    Steve Jones
  • The Secret Password

    As I work with more server systems that help developers run Continuous Integration and automated releases, one of the things I see used often are variables. These are values you can set for a particular process and reference inside of that process. Great for setting server names, paths, etc. In releases, these are great for specifying specific values that change for each environment, such as the instance name or IP address.

    As with many developer based systems, security is not always set tightly on these systems and any developer can access the build server to kick off builds, reconfigure a process, etc. That makes sense in a CI process, but not so much in a release system. This is one reason I do recommend a separate release server from the CI server. You can use Jenkins or TeamCity to perform releases, but is it a good idea? Have you thought through the security?

    In the release servers, one thing that most systems allow the admin to do is use a variable for a password and mark it secret, so the value cannot be recovered. In this way, if some developer is working on the release process, they can’t get the password to the production server. They can only click the buttons that deploy to that server.

    However.

    They can deploy to that server, and they don’t need the password. If I were to execute a script in the release system that executes the “CREATE USER” and a “ALTER ROLE ” commands to give me access to data, does it matter if I know the deployment password is “G4da%$2h#5f” or $(ProdPwd)? It doesn’t. The actual value isn’t relevant; I just need to be able to use it.

    I think release systems are great pieces of software for reducing the risk of your deployments, but I do think the security models need to be carefully designed and easy to configure, especially when it comes to allowing arbitrary code to be submitted and executed by one person. Be sure that developers can’t necessarily deploy code directly to production servers, whether the password is hidden or not. If there is a way to use the value, someone will find it.

    Steve Jones

     

  • The Value of Your Personal Data

    Years ago I read Being Digital by Nicholas Negroponte of MIT. In the book, he relates a story about crossing the border from the US into Canada and a Border Patrol agent asking the value of his laptop. He said millions, not because of the hardware, but because of the data. I thought that was interesting, and I somewhat agree. The data I have on my machines, or really now, in cloud services, is more valuable than the hardware. The hardware is barely worth anything to me, including the time it takes to reinstall my applications, because I really treat my laptop as a piece of cattle. I could drop it, render it completely unusable and I’d be back up, running, and productive with new hardware in less than 4 hours.

    Then I saw this article on ransoming data for iCloud users, where the request is for US$75,000. This is for Apple itself and not individuals, but what if it were for each user? What would I pay to avoid losing all the data on my mobile device?

    It certainly wouldn’t be $75,000 despite the fact I think some of the data I have is precious. I love the pictures and video of my family most of all, but if I lost some of them, maybe all of the digital storage, would I just pay a ransom? Probably not. What about all the code in a VCS for my company? Would we pay a ransom for that? Likely we would, though perhaps not. We might think about reconstructing the code, especially if we were a small company.

    Ultimately I think there isn’t a lot of money to be made with individuals’ data. Too many of us older folks remember when we did lose physical objects and they were just gone. The idea of losing things is painful, but not inconceivable. For younger people, it seems that much of the data we produce and consume is transient and isn’t necessarily that valuable to us. My kids love Snapchat for the ability to create and lose memories. I dislike it for the same reason.

    Much of the data we personally have can be backed up, and possibly recreated if it isn’t. Many of our digital records have the characteristic that while we may have a copy, often some business or organization has another copy. Requesting new data is easy, and while it might cost some time and money, it may be preferable to the idea of paying a ransom, and potentially having to continue to pay again in the future with some virus still on our systems.

    I don’t quite know what to think about ransomware and how this might evolve. I suspect that this will always be a problem in some way, just as hardware failures will likely plague us forever. The only solution I have is to create backups regularly that contain versions, and can be restored to separate, clean devices. I’ve gotten away from my own personal offline backups, mostly because of data size, but I do continue to try and keep at least 2 or 3 backups going to different locations and with different services because my data is at least that important.

    Steve Jones