Tag: security

  • DevOps and Security

    DevOps is a buzzword these days, and like many of the hyped concepts written about, it has a lot of meanings. There is this idea releasing software more often, using automation, having various groups talk to each other, and more, all of  which we might see as common sense. However other DevOps ideas, such as releasing more often (with potentially less review), being willing to break applications and fix them quickly, having developers able to release code to live, production environments, these don’t seem to be ideas that would enhance security for most organizations.

    However, that’s not necessarily the case. Security and DevOps practices aren’t necessarily mutually exclusive. I ran across a piece from the security perspective, looking at some of the ideas in DevOps that can actually enhance security.

    Writing more code, especially around the configuration and infrastructure, allows versioning, auditing, and more that can ensure we have fewer mis-configured systems. Adding some Desired State Configuration (DSR), with some automated testing of this code, could ensure that the changes made don’t open up security holes. Or, at least, allow us to determine who made the change and when the issue appeared. These are important for understand security risk.

    There are also the ideas of measurement, metrics, and feedback, which are important for ensuring security. After all, anomalous behavior should be investigated, as this could be a sign of intrusion. For databases, it’s especially important with the large number of clients that connect to our systems. Adding DevOps style monitoring can allow us to determine if a workload is normal, or perhaps a sign of intentional, accidental, or malicious data query activity.

    I enjoyed the piece, and I’d recommend you read it. Plus, whenever I see “snowflake” in an article, I think of Grant and want to read further to see how someone else has used the same analogy he does.

    Steve Jones

    The Voice of the DBA Podcast

    Listen to the MP3 Audio ( 2.2MB) podcast or subscribe to the feed at iTunes and LibSyn.

  • The Penalty for a Data Breach

    Many of us that work with data are somewhat insulated from the effects of a data breach. Each of us is responsible for writing software, managing the database platform, perhaps even in charge of configuring security. However, in the event of an attack or loss of data, many of us would likely be responsible for the technical aspects of analyzing the weakness or cause of the incident, determining what data might be lost, or perhaps helping to change systems to prevent future incidents.

    Would many of us deal with the penalties or financial liabilities of data loss? Perhaps indirectly, but not much. However our employers (or more likely, their insurance companies) will deal with penalties. Right now there isn’t a lot of liability for companies that lose data. Minor penalties and credit monitoring, but many people are getting upset, which might result in changes.

    What does a company owe you if your information is lost? It’s debatable, and this is likely to become a bigger issue over time as more and more people are affected by this issue. I expect that penalties will increase over time, this will also mean that the requirements and work each of us as data professionals need to do will grow.

    While encryption and other measures can help, they don’t completely protect data. Good security comes about from a number of layers, each of which is designed to thwart, or limit the success of, certain attacks. Those of us that work with data, whether in development or administrative roles, need to educate ourselves and continue to improve our ability to implement secure applications.

    Steve Jones

    The Voice of the DBA Podcast

    Listen to the MP3 Audio ( 2.2MB) podcast or subscribe to the feed at iTunes and LibSyn.

  • Paying for Data

    Would you recommend your organization pay a ransom to get the key to decrypt data that’s become encrypted on your database systems? What if the data were encrypted in backups going back two weeks?

    It’s an interesting question, and one I might expect we will have to deal with at some point. This week I saw an announcement that another organization, this time a university, paid a ransom to recover data. Before you react with “of course, not,” think about this quote from the University Vice-President:

    “We are a research institution,” she was quoted as saying. “We are conducting world class research daily and we don’t know what we don’t know in terms of who’s been impacted and the last thing we want to do is lose someone’s life’s work.”

    That’s a powerful statement, and certainly one that I could see salespeople, accountants, and more making as an appeal to upper management. What’s interesting in the piece is that the university acknowledges that using the decryption keys is a complex endeavor, requiring IT to get systems operational again. I hope that at the least they also made new backups of the encrypted data before using the keys. Who knows what sort of results come about from criminals that have encrypted, and the offered to provide reversal instructions and keys.

    I expect the ransomware efforts to become more prevalent across the next few years, especially as people have success. Even if fewer people pay ransoms, I bet plenty of people will look to disrupt organizations with these actions. Perhaps even a competitor will look to introduce ransomware into your company? Maybe by offering a job to an individual that leaves such a surprise behind as they get ready to move to a new employer.

    There are all sorts of issues here, and potential attack vectors. The fact that ransomware (or other malicious software) could be introduced to remain idle, or even transparently encrypt and decrypt systems until a date passes and the keys delete themselves, is horrifying. At the very least, I think this brings to mind the idea that we need multiple versions of backups, so mirroring a file system to another location, or some cloud service like Azure, Dropbox, etc., isn’t enough. Perhaps we should also have checks in place that look for changes. After all, can you imagine a rouge process implementing TDE and letting it run for a month before deleting the certificates from your system and truncating all the tables a week later?

    Steve Jones

  • Changing Your PASS Credentials

    I got an email today from PASS, noting that credentials were changing from username to email. That’s fine. I don’t really care, but I know I got multiple emails to different accounts, so which account is associated with which email?

    I clicked the “login details” link in the email and got this:

    2016-05-24 12_31_06-PASS _ User Login

    Not terribly helpful, but I was at least logged in. If I click my name, I see this:

    2016-05-24 14_09_26-Movies & TV

    Some info, including the email, which I’m not sure is linked to the email I clicked on, or is based on browser cookies. However, there’s no username here.

    If I click the edit profile link, I get more info, but again, no username. No way to tie back anything I’ve done in the past to this account.

    2016-05-24 14_12_28-Movies & TV

    I have always used a username to log into the SQLSaturday site, so I went there. On this PASS property, I’ve got my username.

    2016-05-24 14_14_46-Movies & TV

    If I click the username, I go back to the PASS site, to the MySQLSaturday section, but again, no link to this username. However I realize now which email is related to which username.

    Hopefully the others will go dormant soon and I won’t get multiple announcements, connectors, ballots, etc.

    The point here isn’t to pick on PASS as much as it is to point out some poor software and communication preferences. Changing to email from username (or vice versa) can be a disruptive change. I’d expect the email would include some information on username and email relation, or at least username since it was sent to a specific email. That would allow me to determine where I might need to contact PASS to update things, or which username was affected for me.

    I’d also expect that the username to be stored somewhere and visible on the site. Even if this isn’t valid login information, why not just show it? When we migrated SQLServerCentral from one platform to another, we kept some columns in the database that showed legacy information. This information wasn’t really used, but it did help track down a few problems we had with the migration. Having a bit of data is nice, and it doesn’t cost much (at least in most cases).

    This wasn’t a smooth process, though not too broken for me. I like that PASS sent the communication, and I’m glad the old method still works. I logged in with username today. I wish there was a bit more consistency between PASS applications, and that they included a date when username will no longer work. I also hope they update their testing (or test plan) with any issues they discover this week, so the problems aren’t repeated.